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THE DAY WORSENS Major I.B. Aird, the who newly inherited command of the 4th CLY (in Cranley's absence) was determined to repay the Germans with equal measure. He first intended to reach the besieged 'A' Squadron at Pt.213. At 10.30 am, 'A' Squadron reported being surrounded and attacked by Tigers (from Wittman's company), and Mark IVs (from the Pz Lehr). Aird had to move fast if his comrades at Pt.213 were to be saved. He intended to first send in infantry up ahead to root out enemy forces within Villers-Bocage before committing the surviving tanks of 'B' Squadron for a breakthrough. Using radio, Cranley vetoed Aird's plan but did request a smoke screen thrown up by the divisional artillery so that they run for the cover of the town. The attempt was a remarkable failure. Sometime later, Cranley was reporting that his position was becoming untenable and that withdrawal was impossible. Then at 10.35 pm 'A' Squadron's radios went dead. Presumably some terrible fate had overtaken the Viscount and the squadron, and it had, for at this time, Cranley and his command had been overrun by superior enemy forces. The Viscount was taken prisoner while hiding in the woods and joining seventeen 'A' Squadron men in the stockade. In stark contrast, the 'A' Coy of the Rifle brigade, which had been mauled, surrendered in masse, with fifty men taken prisoner. All in all, only about thirty British soldiers from Pt.213 got through the German net to reach the town. Suspicious of the fate that had befallen 'A' Squadron, Aird now prepared to hold the town with 'B' Squadron against the inevitable German counter-push to take it. As he prepared his defenses, he was cheered by the new at 1 pm that infantry of the 1/7th Queens Royal Regiment had arrived in Villers-Bocage. Their arrival was the responsibility of Brigadier Hinde of the 22nd Armoured Brigade, who was alarmed at the disaster overtaking his lead regiment. |
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Riding into battle. Infantry of the Queens Bn moves towards Villers-Bocage in Bren carriers and lorries. The infantry of the armoured divisions were all motorized, but almost always the armour outran the infantry, with the end result there was infrequently any sort of mutual support or cohesion between the two branches in combat. |
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The 4th Yeomanry's 'C' Squadron in the meantime was still bivouacked at Tracy-Bocage, a small village 1.25 miles east, where it would stay for the remainder of the battle. It was joined here by the Cromwells of the 5th RTR and a company of the Rifle Brigade. Inexplicable, when Hinde could have taken the initiative by unleashing this 'battlegroup' in flanking maneuver to cut the enemy's counterattack at its roots, he failed to do so. In the meantime, the 1/7th Queens under Lt Colonel Desmond Gordon, hastily redeployed in the town , positioning their PIATs and the anti-tank guns in the houses for an ambush - they were just in time. Wittmann was deliberating with General 'Sepp' Dietrich, the commander of the I SS Panzer Corps, and had been given permission to mount a second sortie to recapture Villers-Bocage - this time with supporting elements from other units in the area.
At noon, Wittmann (in a replacement tank) rumbled back to Villers-Bocage with a pair of Tigers and a Panzer Mk IVH. It was just after 1 pm when Wittman and his troop returned to the scene of action, headed towards the town's vital road intersection that was their objective. This intersection formed a vital point in the line; to the south it led to Mont Pinçon, the west led to Caumont, the north to Tilly and while the east led to Caen itself; Wittmann had strict orders from Dietrich to recapture the town and hold the intersection until reinforcements arrived. As they moved down, they ran into an ambush in the main square set up by a troop of four Cromwells and a firefly. A six-pounder (57 mm) cannon was also dug in near the main square to catch any panzers succeeded in running the ambush blockade. |
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Projectile Infantry An anti-tank squad ready its primary weapon, the percussion-fired PIAT (Projectile Infantry Anti Tank). Somewhat more primitive than the US bazooka, as it was in effect little more than a spring-loaded grenade launcher, the PIAT was nevertheless an invaluable weapon for British infantry, which lacked any weapon of a comparable type. Still, the weapon's 2.5 lb grenade could be fired over 155 yards, and could at its most effective range, penetrate almost a hundred millimeters of armour. It was also slightly innaccurate in comparison to the bazooka.
Reliable survivor The 6-pdr gun was sadly outdated by 1944, but it formed the main equipment ofthe army's divisional anti-tank detachments in Normandy. It's light 57 mm shell could punch through 120 mms of armour at 110 yards, and 70 mms at a thousand yards. |
The British let the first Tiger (commanded by Wittman) pass, but the following panzers took the full brunt of the ambush. The Firefly, commanded Sergeant Bramall, fired at a passing Tiger, and missed, hitting a building across the street. But his second shot was dead-on tearing into the Tiger's flanks to set it ablaze. Seconds later, the third Tiger also fell, this time to the guns of the Cromwell commanded by Corporal Horne whose crew achieved a perfect kill by hitting the monster's weakly armoured rear. The following Mark IV was caught off guard by the sudden destruction of its two companions and amidst showers of PIAT bombs fired by nearby British infantry attempted to retreat. It turned tail and sped full speed up the main street, firing on houses to keep the infantry pinned down, but unfortunately the German crew had failed to reckon with the presence of Bramall's firefly. Bramall swiftly pulled his machine out its ambush position at the square, aimed squarely down at the retreating enemy panzer and fired. The high-velocity shell caught the Mark IV in its rear and it blew it up. The German crew emerged from flame blown hatches and attempted to find cover in the ruined street, and unfortunately for the British, owing to the confusion of the battle, they were able to get away to fight another day. Unaware of what had happened, Wittman still rolled on towards the intersection, but ran into the 6-pounder gun in the safeguard position. Wittman spotted the anti-tank gun a moment after the British gunners were already traversing their weapon. Desperately, Woll attempted to bring the 88mm cannon to bear, but a split second later the British gunners had fired. The nimble shell punched through the Tiger at point-blank range, smashing through the left suspension, and immobilizing the panzer. The great menace had finally been quelled. Bailing out of the stricken tank with small arms, Wittman and his crew got away as well, as there was no British infantry in the surrounding houses to stop them. In other quarters of the town, the battle was joined as several Mark IVs from the Panzer Lehr attempt to shatter the British defenses, but were repulsed as they lacked infantry support. However, Wittman's compatriot, Hauptstrumfürher (Captain) Rolf Möbus of the 1st Company and his force of SS Tigers with limited infantry support managed to breach the outer eastern defenses of the Queens. The battalion commander, Lt Colonel Gordon later wrote: "A report was received that several Mark VI Tiger tanks were moving down the main street towards the square. Major 'Tiny' French of 'C' Company immediately ordered his Company to disperse into the houses in the side streets which overlooked |
| the main road and to be prepared to take aggressive action. He then personally took a PIAT and together with a small party armed with 'sticky bombs', went off further into the town in the direction from which the enemy tanks were approaching. He found four Tiger tanks and one Mark IV in the main street and approached the leading one with from a side street to within 20 yards. He fired two rounds with his PIAT while his party threw their sticky bombs. (It takes a brave man to even carry a sticky bomb, let alone throw one.) The results of this attack could not be observed but it caused one tank to move forward where it was driven onto waiting 6-pdr anti-tank guns [of the battalion] and completely destroyed. During this attack one of the enemy tanks blew down a house near which Major French was standing and he was wounded in the leg, but, in spite of this, returned to collect his Company and take them into their allotted positions." |
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Bloody Street fighting The Tigers of the Möbius's 1st Company meet their end at the hands of the Queens infantry and Cromwell tanks on the streets of Villers-Bocage. |
On the opposite side, SS Sergeant Werner Wendt, the commander of a Tiger, later wrote that: ""There was fire from all corners. Even today I can still picture SS Second Lieutenant Lucasius as he was knocked out by the close range weapons. He bailed out. His burns looked frightening." In all, the infantrymen of the Queens alone accounted for at least one Tiger and a Mark IV with PIATs and Gammon (sticky) bombs. A group of four surviving SS Tigers pressed down the main street but were ambushed by 'B' Squadron Cromwells from No. 4 Troop led by Lieutenant William L. 'Bill' Cotton, MM, and by a 6-pounder anti-tank gun from the Queens. Elsewhere, groups of Queens went 'tank-hunting' with PIATs and anti-tank grenades. The battle raged for the next six hours and between the Queens and Cotton's No. 4 Troop, the British destroyed four remaining Tigers and the last of the attacking enemy infantry. Villers-Bocage was secure once again, at least for the time being. Möbius later declared that he was forced to withdraw after losing three tanks to close range weapons. Still, the British later found the wrecks of six Tigers and two Mark IVs within the town after the battle. |
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As the battle eased at 2.30 pm, Brigadier Ekins of the 131st (Queens) Brigade visited Villers-Bocage to gain a first-hand view of the situation. Gordon despondently told his superior officer that enemy infantry was infiltrating his forward positions relentlessly, mostly from the Pz Lehr division. Eakin in response muttered darkly that the situation was hopeless and left. He was not missed. Then at 3.25 pm, Gordon drove to the 22nd Brigade forward headquarters at Amaye-sur-Seulles to discuss the battle with Brigadier 'Loony' Hinde. There found the normally firebrand Hinde, reclusive and ill prepared to discuss the situation. Gordon stressed that unless his battalion was reinforced, the battle would be lost. unfortunately, he was unable to get that point across to the brigadier. As Gordon later wrote: "I don't think 'Looney' quite appreciated that I was rapidly losing control of my companies because of the many tank hunting parties that were dispersed in the nearby houses' a situation not helped by the scarcity of radios in an infantry battalion at that time." Hinde did however radio Aird with instructions to hold Villers-Bocage at all costs. It was an absurd order to enforce. |
| 'Sepp' Dietrich was determined to finish off the British and organized a mixed bag of two 88mm self-propelled guns, three field artillery cannons and infantry to infiltrate the town and recapture it in bloody street-by-street fighting. Supporting them would be a concerted attempt by the recently arrived 2nd Panzer Division to circle around and isolate the Villers-Bocage from the bulk of the 7th Armoured in the west. The British divisional commander, Major General Erskine finally decided that the time had come to take a more active participation in the battle. At 3 pm, he ordered the 1/5th Queens Regiment to advance on Livry within fifteen minutes. This battalion was intended to support the 1/7th should the time come; instead it would become embroiled in its own battle against the advancing spearheads of the 2nd Panzer Division. |
Achtung! A German infantry squad attempts to pick its way past the British. |
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At 4 pm, the lead elements of the 1/7th Queens reported enemy infantry approaching from the southwest. The battle was fierce. The 1/7th Queens maintained a stoic defense, inflicting severe losses to the enemy infantry and destroying nine panzers, but also losing eight officers and 120 men. East, the 2nd Panzer Davison (two battalions of panzer-grenadiers and several troops of tanks) had run into the 1/5th Queens at Tracy-Bocage, which was supported by the self-propelled 25-pdr Sexton artillery tanks of 5th Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) and some Rifle Brigade platoons, who were themselves in charge of protecting the artillery gunners. The RHA gunners, especially those in 'CC' Battery took on the enemy battlegroup over open sights due to their close proximity. Even the Rifle Brigade held strong with its Bren Light Machine guns, but such was the intensity of combat and the depleting reserves that even non-combatants were thrust into battle. British Cooks, linesmen, signalers and storekeepers were given a weapon and thrust into the battle, and together they held back the German tide, killing or wounding hundreds of determined panzer-grenadiers and knocking-out eight Mark IVs. |
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Stiff combat A British infantrmen armed with a Enfield rifle finds cover in front of a knocked-out Mark IV. |
By evening, the 1/7th Queens had done well, but it was badly depleted and its headquarters was pinned down by heavy artillery fire. Gordon radioed that that the town was in danger of falling if reinforcements were not dispatched on the double. But no reinforcements were forthcoming. At 4.50 pm, Hinde told Erskine that the situation had become difficult, and consequently Erskine ordered a withdrawal at 5 pm. Between then and eight pm, the British pulled back from Villers-Bocage under the protection afforded by an American artillery bombardment. They withdrew two miles west to a defensive 'brigade box' at Tracy-Bocage, reminiscent of North African defensive positions, which they would hold for next many days against repeated assaults .
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The day's fighting had cost the 22nd Armoured brigade (including the Rifle Brigade): 20 Cromwells, 4 Sherman Fireflys, 3 Stuarts, 3 Humber scout cars, 3 artillery control Sherman V tanks, 14 Bren gun carriers, 14 M3 half-tracks and two 6-pdr antitank guns. More than a hundred soldiers had been captured and 62 had been killed. The bulk of the armoured casualties were from the 4th Country of London Yeomanry, which ceased to exist as a fighting formation. The regiment was disbanded and its remnants constituted into the 3rd Country of London Yeomanry to become the only and only 'Sharpshooters', the 3rd/4th CLY. In the Queens brigade, the two battalions had lost between them almost four hundred men. The 101st SS Bn on the other hand lost 10 men killed and twelve wounded, with as many as ten tanks destroyed. Comparatively, the whole of LXVII and the I SS Pz Corps had lost at least 25 tanks butting against the British at Villers-Bocage and the surrounding area. Against British losses, it was not quite the over-glorified victory as demonstrated by German propaganda publications and even some post-war allied books. Nevertheless, it was still a convincing victory for Germany, made only apparent by the fact that the British failed to carry through with 'Perch', at least beyond Villers-Bocage. The premature British withdrawal from the offensive was the sole deciding factor in Germany's triumph. As it was, the Germans had failed to achieve its objective - which was to capture Villers-Bocage, as it fell into its hands, only after the British had first abandoned it. But to take nothing away from the German troops or Wittman, their bold tactics had won the day. Pz Lehr's flanks had been secured and what was more Caen was still in their hands. This first defeat would cost the British and the Canadians dear in the eventual follow-on attempts to take Caen. One could only speculate what would have been the course of the Normandy campaign if 'Perch' had succeeded. Without a doubt, British casualties would still have been high considering that the seven and more enemy panzer divisions in the British sector would have to be eliminated in hard battle before the campaign could be decreed as won. Yet, the final casualty rate for Normandy would have undoubtedly been mitigated if Caen, that crucible of Normandy had fallen at a time when it was weakly defended - and that was the true opportunity wasted by the 7th Armoured Division. As for Wittman; the young panzer officer was elevated to a national hero on a scale that mere mortals could only dream about. Signal magazine, the wartime propaganda forces publication released several glowing articles on the young panzer commander's history and achievement. They blurred the achievements of the entire 101st SS Bn into one form - Wittman - a misconception that is still sustained by some contemporary books and articles. True, Wittman's exploits were remarkable,. His tactics were good and his kill tally, the most impressive amongst the 101st SS, but he was also lucky. yet, what were his true feats? Unmistakably, his rise to stardom came from the fact that of the 64 British armoured vehicles lost by the British at Villers-Bocage, at least eighteen were the victims of Wittman's Tiger. Fritz Bayerlein heartily recommended the swords to Wittman's Knight's Cross – a request readily granted. The farm boy was also promoted to captain. Later, Wittman refused a position as an instructor in an officer's tactical school, but would pay the ultimate price for his decision. On 8 August 1944 during the Anglo-Canadian drive on Falaise, Wittman and his Tiger (No. 007) would be blown to eternity whilst engaged in combat against a squadron of British Fireflies from the 1st Northamptonshire Regiment near Cintheaux. A first hit in the right flank of the Tiger set off a fire within the tank, and a second hit blew the turret off. There were no survivors, except for Woll who was fortuitously undergoing treatment at a military hospital at the time. As it transpired, the plucky gunner survived not only Normandy but also the war. He later died in 1996. Wittmann and his crew's bodies were later discovered forty years after the war and moved from the unmarked field grave to the La Gambe cemetery in Normandy in 1983. |
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© Akhil Kadidal 2004. Text and all artwork (except where noted) are copyright the author, and may not be used in other websites or in any other professional manner without consent.
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