THE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES

The American 4th 'Ivy' Infantry Division was a veteran of D-Day. It was landed on 'Utah' beach to lead the way into the Cotentin peninsula. By Late-1944, there were very few of its D-Day veterans still in service. Unfortunately, in Hurtgen, the last of those veterans would be purged. Cota withdrew his tired remants of his division in the second week of November, and relinquished his positions to the approaching troops of the 4th Division. A week then passed, and the 4th Division was yet to receive any word concerning offensive actions. Then at 2245 hours on November 15, the division's infantry regiments received word of a major operation to take place the following morning, the 16th. Two infantry regiments, the 8th and the 22nd were to cross the Roer Weh stream and head east - towards Grosshau and beyond. Unlike previous attempts aimed at Schmidt, American commanders had switched their objectives to targets in the Grosshau-Kleinhau area, and north towards Duren. Opposing the Americans was the 275th Volksgrenadier division with a hodgepodge of artillery and anti-tank guns, including several assault guns, nine 105mm howitzers, six 155mm guns and ten 122mm cannons. General Schmidt, the divisional commander also had 106 pieces of field artillery ranging from 88mm to 210 mms, not counting mortars. He also had twenty-two 75mm anti-tank Pak40 guns and a single 88mm anti-tank cannon. Facing these were a mere 96 artillery guns of the 4th Infantry Division.

Map III. The 4th Infantry Division's attack.

At 1245 hours on November 16, the 8th and the 22nd Regiments stepped over the shallow Roer Weh and headed for their objectives. They faced stiff resistance from outset, suffering heavily until US commanders ceased all operations in December 3. The 22nd Regiment, which had some of the toughest objectives to take including Grosshau (which fell on 29 November) lost 2774 soldiers - constituting 84 percent of its pre-battle strength. The 4th Division was virtually finished as a combat unit, and it was withdrawn to Luxembourg to refit.

The battle was far from won, and Hodges sent in the 8th Infantry Division to have its turn in the forest. On November 16, the division's reconnaissance troops and the 13th Infantry Regiment led the division's march into the Hurtgen. On November 19, the 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 2nd Rangers Battalion joined the division inside the forest. Soon after, combat orders came from V Corps. The V Corps commander, Lt General Gerow, still insisted in interfering with divisional operations, and specified orders for the 121st Regiment, which was to capture the Hurtgen-Kleinhau ridge - considered by the enemy as the key to his defense of Duren. On te other side of the line, the Germans had fortified the area and committed Battlegroup Wegelein (later renamed Weinen) to its defense, along with elements from the 985th and the 1056th Grenadier Regiments. Back at the 8th Divisional headquarters in Rott, staff officers planned their offensive. The 121st Infantry Regiment was to first size the wooded terrain west of Hurtgen town before attacking and overrunning the town itself. The nearby village Kleinhau was also to be captured. Following that, the regiment was to clear the roads leading to and exiting Hurtgen town from mines and obstacles, to allow the Sherman tanks of Combat Command 'R' (from the 5th Armored Division) to use them.

Map IV. Overview of the 8th Division attack. Click Image for large image

Since the 121st's advance was expected to be heavily contested and mined, it was given the 12th Combat Engineer Battalion - swelling the regiment to over four thousand strong. In excess, almost all of the 8th divisional artillery was to support the 121st's drive. Other organic and inorganic attachments to the 121st included: 'A' Company, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 'B' and 'C' Companies of the 86th Chemical Battalion. The bolstering of a single infantry regiment with such massive forces was thus far unforeseen in the campaign, but its need would be amply justified.

On the morning of November 21st the 121st Regiment swung into action. Attacking with three battalions abreast, the regiment ran in opposition almost immediately. GI advancing through the muddy undergrowth, leapt for cover as German artillery shells began smacking into the towering firs. Trees began falling, and worse still, sharp, lethal splinters rained down on the Americans. Scrambeling for safety, other Americans touched off mines. Casualties began to mount, and the advance slowed to a snail's pace. Only Lt Colonel Roy Hogan's 3rd battalion on the right flank reached its objectives by the end of the day. It was also with this battalion that Staff Sergeant John W. Minick, won the 8th Division's third Medal of Honor of the war.

The MOH. The Medal of Honor was America's highest award for gallantry in combat. It was worn around the neck, and different versions were allocated for the Army and the Navy. The above version is for the Army (the naval version did not have the wreath).

Blocked by a large German minefield, nicknamed the Wilde Sua ('Wild Boar'), the third battalion languished in the open, the butt end of heavy artillery and mortar fire. Combat engineers were requested, but fully aware that the battalion would take further casualties in the time that they needed to get to the front, Staff Sergeant Minick volunteered to lead a section of four men to clear the minefield. He and his squad crawled for 300 yards through barbed-wire and debris, but were spotted by a German MG42 post. Signaling his men to take cover, Minick outflanked the MG42. As he closed in to within range of the enemy post, he opened fire, killing two Germans and taking three others prisoner. Moving forward again, he came upon an entire company of Germans. It took a brave man to take on even a squad of Germans, but Minick single-handedly killed twenty enemy soldiers and capturing another twenty. Rallied by his actions, the rest of his platoon succeed in overrunning the surviving members of the German company. Moving forward, again, and spearheading the battalion's advance, Minick once again drew machine-gun fire. Crawling forward, he destroyed this gun post and it's crew with grenades, but there still another minefield to be crossed, and it proved one too many. Advancing alone, and in the face of intense German fire, Minick stepped on a land mine and was killed. It was the tragic end of a fine soldier.

The other battalions meantime were suffering grave setbacks. The 1st Battalion in the center made only slight advances, while the 2nd Battalion was brought to a complete standstill by the enemy. Languishing in an hostile area filled with mines and pummeled by artillery, the Americans took punishing losses. Three times, the regiment attempted to renew its advance on the following day, and was thwarted on all three occassions.

How's about a hand? A Sherman tank rolls past the breached Siegfried lines with infantry hitching a ride aboard. The white triangle shapes seen in the photograph were called 'Dragon's Teeth' and were concrete tank traps laid by the Germans as part of their defenses. The Sherman was the backbone of the US Armored Corps during WWII, but its armor, especially in the above variant (which looks like an M4A4) was diastrously thin and it 75mm gun lacked punch. Neverthless, the tank served with distinction in every theatre. Photo ©US National Archives

On the 18th, the Americans decided to use armor. Since medium tanks could not operate in the muddy terrain of the forest, Stuart light tanks from the 709th Tank Battalion were brought up. But the Stuarts barely made a dent in the enemy' defenses. A stalemate was developing.

For a week, the Americans stayed in their exposed positions, suffering from enemy fire and physiological trauma. Infuriated with the pathetic progress of the 121st Regiment, the divisional commander Major General Donald Stroh sacked its commander, Colonel John R. Jeter, replacing him with one of his staff officers, Colonel Thomas Cross. Then on November 24, the regiment went on the attack again.

As before, progress was extremely slow, and in an effort to get the initiative, Stroh threw in the whole of the 709th Tank Battalion into the fray - but to no avail. German reinforcements were pouring into the area; the Americans badly needed the medium armor of the Combat Command R (CCR) but the Shermans could not proceed, as the road was still in enemy hands. Nevertheless, in a conference at First Army headquarters, Hodges decided that it was time that the armor went in.

On the morning of November 25th, the Shermans began to roll, accompanied by four companies of infantry to deal with anti-tank screens and enemy infantry. Aided by a smokescreen set up by the 12th Combat Engineers, the tankers attempted to smash through a large German roadblock on the road to Hurtgen town - at a point where the road curved towards the town. But as the tank column exited the forest, just outside Hurtgen, four Shermans were knocked out by anti-tank fire. They blocked the only route that the armor could use. Combat Command R's armored infantry battalion mounted in halftracks and trucks were then ordered to move astride the road, but were similarly destroyed. The attack had stalled before it had even begun. Things were not going as planned...