As the 109th struggled towards Hurtgen town, further south, the 110th Infantry's drive on Simonskall had stalled against heavy enfilading fire coming from a network of minefield-concertina wire and pillboxes near Raffelsbrand. Like the 109th, the regiment became dispersed. Men became separated from their units in the woods and their feeling of isolation turned into despair. Felt that they were forgotten, thier orders were replaced by a higher call to survive. Many GIs fled to the rear in deep agitation. Disheartened, Cota decided to try again on the following day, but on this occassion the regiment was badly mauled. One company returned with less than forty-five soldiers, and in some battalions, all company-level officers were killed or wounded. Determined to succeed, Cota fed in his reserve battalion into the battle - it was a decision that he would soon come to regret.

While the 110th was being battered, the 112th Regiment meantime, was making good progress. Led by Colonel Carl L. Patterson, the regiment had left Germeter on the morning of the 2nd, and by late-morning had approached Vossenack. The 2nd Battalion of the regiment under Lt Colonel Hatzfeld attacked Vossenack ridge with a company of tanks. Opposing the regiment was the German 275th Volksgrenadier Division under Major General Hans Schmidt, well strengthened by artillery and twenty-one Assault guns. General Schmidt had deployed his troops around Vossenack. His assault guns were positioned on the Brandenberg-Bergstein Ridge - within sight of Vossenack. American tanks rumbling forward caught the accurate fire of the assault guns and many were knocked out, before their crews realized what was happening. Milling past the burning hulks, Hatzfeld's infantry proceeded to secure Vossenack by mid-afternoon. The surviving American armor then hid among the shattered buildings of the town, while the infantry dug-in on the bald, northern slope of the ridge.

German observation officers on the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge could clearly see them deploying and called in artillery and mortar bombardment on the Americans. Shell after shell pounded the ridge, until it was a treeless, disfigured hump. Repeated pleas by the exposed US infantrymen to pull back into Vossenack town were obstinately refused by staff officers, who had no firsthand assessment of the situation. It was only at nightfall when the shelling died away.

On the following day, on 3 November, the regiment's fortunes took an upturn when it passed through Kommerscheidt and actually took Schmidt before nightfall. German soldiers were captured drunk, playing cards or eating, and the earlier intelligence reports of second-rate troops seemed justified. The American infantrymen entrenched themselves, albeit in superficial positions, and laid out an anti-tank minefield to thwart enemy counterattacks, but failed to properly bury or camouflage the mines. They were simply too tired, and after all they had accomplished their mission. Moreover, they were absolutely sure that relief was just hours away. Back at headquarters, Cota was being congratulated by his superiors. The capture of Schmidt, whereas the 9th Division had failed, had been a major coup for the general; and even though the 109th and the 110th Regiments had been mangled almost beyond recognition, Cota said that he felt like a little 'Napoleon'. His exultation would be premature. Less than forty miles away, on November 2nd, Field Marshal Walter Model of Army Group B was conducting a map exercise near cologne, When he had first received news of the American attack towards Schmidt, Model had dispatched elements from the 116th Panzer Division from Hurtgen town to counterattack the Americans (see Map I). Now, on the 3rd, he ordered General Erich Brandenberger of the German 7th Army to throw in the bulk of his armor against the 112th Regiment in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt sector. As an added measure, the elements from the German 89th Division and its 1055th Grenadier Regiment were told to support the counter-attack. Unknown to the Americans, strong Germans forces were about to unleash a devastating counter-offensive on thier ill-prepared positions.

PANIC TAKES HOLD

On November 4, following a brief artillery barrage, the German counterattack went into action against the 112th at Schmidt. Medium Panther and Mark IV tanks of the 116th Panzer Division, impervious to the bazookas of the 112th's infantrymen, rolled through the sloppy minefield put up by the regiment the night before, and overran position after position, firing on the hapless Americans as they abandoned their foxholes. Officers desperately called in air-strikes, but American fighter-bombers could not distinguish from friend and foe and were useless. Then suddenly a rumor spread amongst the Americans that an order for withdrawal was about to come, and the next thing, as one officer recalled, "four columns of ragged, scattered, disorganized infantrymen streamed back ... in low morale. We managed to stop some but most streamed back to the rear." One company in its panic headed the wrong way - into enemy lines and was destroyed. American soldiers in Kommerscheidt attempt frantically to block the deserters and were partly successful, stopping at least 200 men from fleeing any further. But hundreds more got through the blockade, retreating to Vossenack and Germeter.

Adaptable survivor. The Mark IV was the backbone of Germany's Panzer arm during the 1941-43 period, and served on admirably until the end of the war. It was the only German tank to see widespread service during the entire period of the war (with steady improvements). The above is a Mark IVH, which was armed with a long-barreled 75mm KwK40 L/48 cannon and two machine guns. The armor thickness was average - comparable to the standard Sherman - of which the Mark IV was a direct counterpart of. The side plate seen on the above machine is called Shurzen, and was extra armor to offset this equailty. Tanks such as these were the most common of German panzers to see service in the Hurtgen, although several other types, notable the dangerous Panther and the Stug self-propelled gun were also used. ©Unknown

Cota in response, ordered the 112th to re-take Schmidt, and sent a task force to assist the regiment. But the 112th had its hands full; the regiment spent the next forty-eight hours just trying to hold on to Kommerscheidt. Aiding the infantrymen was a small tank force under US First Lt Raymond E. Flieg, but armor or no armor, casualties escalated. Unfortunately, further reinforcements for the regiment were not forthcoming as Cota had already committed the division's reserve battalion in the aid of the 110th Regiment. By now, the German had begun interdicting the Kall trail, mining and re-mining it night after night. The designation of the narrow and muddy Kall trail as the main supply route (MSR) for the 112th regiment was another major blunder by Cota and his staff. The trail meandered from Vossenack to Kommerscheidt, winding down perilously steep gorges in the thick of the forest. It was hardly suited to suport a regimental attack, and as the Americans discovered, could barely be defended.

Reinforcements speeding down the trail to Kommerscheidt found themselves riding a road to hell, as they blundered into mines and enemy ambushes with anti-tank guns. Infantry and engineers sent to clear the trail came under German airbursts (a large caliber shell lobbed into the trees to splinter it, so a hail of lead and sharp wood would rain down on the men below). An aid station was then set up on the trail to deal with casualties and serve as a base for the infantry needed to deal with the frequent German incursions into the area. But as before, the Americans began to feel isolated and forgotten, and felt little regard for the divisional chain of command or their orders.

Rumbling to their doom. An American M10 Wolverene Tank Destroyer rumbles through the slush and the mud on the Kall trail towards the 112th Regiment at Kommerscheidt. Few of efforts to reach the 112th ever succeeded after the Germans cut the road. Waiting for them would be panzergrenadiers such this young draftee (right) - little more than a teenager - who is heavily armed with Gewehr 43 rifle, an Stg.44 assault rifle and a panzerfaust, which could rip through 240 mm of armor at a range of 80 m (later increased to 150 m in improved models). Allied tank crews came to fear the panzerfaust, but could little to anticipate or stop attacks, as they frequently only became aware of the danger after taking a hit.

Meantime in Vossenack, the 2nd Battalion of the 112th Regiment was in a bad way. German artillery and mortar strikes had rained down ever since the battalion had occupied the town and ridge on November 2. The bmbardment then continued non-stop for four days. The Germans would target each individual foxhole until it was destroyed before moving on to the next. This sort of clinical persistence began to have its effect on the men, and inflicted a grevious blow to battalion morale. The battalion commander, Lt Colonel Hatzfeld, was particularly affected, mumbling and muttering in the town church, his nerves gone. Then on the morning of the 6th, his men panicked.

The dawn was unusually peaceful, but as daylight improved, the artillery came down in greater intensity than before. Small groups of fear-crazed GIs abandoned their foxholes and fled to the rear to escape what they knew to be a meaningless death. As they streamed back, the panic-stricken mob absorbed more and more men, until it snowballed, sucking anyone who chanced on its path. Some men, who fled were simply terrified, but others joined in the belief that an order to withdraw had been given. Finally at 10.30 am, a group of seventy armed Americans formed a line and held back the retreat, although several small groups of deserters got away. Making maximum use of the choas, the Germans, moved forward and occupied some of the former US positions. Their ocupation was short-lived as the newly-arrived 146th Combat Engineers Battalion arived on the scene. The engineers, armed with heavy weapons, including flamethrowers and mortars advanced in short, leapfrogging spurs, and drove out the enemy. By now, Lt Colonel Hatzfeld was in shambles. His command gone, Hatzfield finally collapsed into tears early in the afternoon. He pleas for reinforcements had gone unanswered, and in a state of trauma, he told his staff that he was heading back to Germeter with the affirmed intention of returning with help. It was the last time that his officers saw him. Stumbling into Germeter dazed and suffering from a broken ankle, Hatzfield was tagged by the medics as a battle casualty, but the damage was greater than the medics could have realized. The Lt Colonel had suffered a complete mental breakdown, and was incapable of commanding even his own faculties.

By dusk on November 6th, the Germans had interdicted the Kall trail completely, leaving the tired troops of 112th at Kommerscheidt to their devices. The Germans also occupied the aid station, capturing its extensive food and medical supplies, and re-mined the trail. American reinforcements attempting to break through, battled with the Germans in bloody, hand to hand fighting. In desperation, Cota sent in the 707th Tank battalion under Lt Colonel Richard W. Ripple to clear the way. Ripple's tanks roared down the trail at full speed, shooting up Germans in their path, and reached Kommerscheidt before the day was out, but they had succeeded in keeping the trail open for only a few hours. Before long, the Germans had closed in again. To make matters worse, Ripple's force was not strong enough to make a difference at Kommerscheidt. Unfazed, Cota ordered his assistant divisional commander, Brigadier General George A. Davis to lead another task force towards Schmidt. He also ordered the already battered 109th Infantry to first open the Kall trail. Demoralized, the 109th went to its task with a heavy heart but got lost in the woods and ended up in the wrong place - to the rear of the 110th Regiment!

Back at Kommerscheidt, the situation was grimmer than ever. Repeated German artillery and infantry assaults on the 112th's positions were creating terrific problems for Colonel Peterson. His men were short on ammo and food, and their damp foxholes, because of the constant moistness, were freezing over with each passing night. Morale was on a razor's edge, and Peterson feared the worst. He had not long to wait. On the following day, November 7, a combined panzer and infantry assault created chaos in the American ranks. Dazed and terror-crazed soldiers fled from the enemy, refusing to take orders from their officers. Almost 260 American servicemen were taken prisoner. Those that still hung out grimly awaited the inevitable German assault tomorrow or the day after that would finish them off for good.

Map II. The Kall Trail.

Cota decided to get a first hand review of the situation, and on afternoon of November 7, made his first and only visit to the front by visiting the 112th's second battalion at Vossenack. The general seemed to carry a guardian angle upon his shoulders, for all the time he was at Vossenack, not a single artillery shell fell, but the moment he left, a shell planted itself right where his jeep had been parked just five minutes before. Cota's visit to Vossenack did little except reveal the scale of the desperation. That same day, Cota supposedly sent a message (which he later denied sending) to Peterson in Kommerscheidt to report back to divisional headquarters immediately. Peterson with a two-man tem for protection attempted to circumvent German patrols, but failed. Engineers later found the colonel on the trail, wounded twice; his escorts dead. Taken to the divisonal headquarters, Cota furiously accused the colonel of deserting his men, and then fainted.

After this bizarre event, Cota finally accepted that the Kall trail had been lost, and on Wednesday, November 8, ordered the 112th in Kommerscheidt to "fight your way out" . This was no easy task. Strong German forces encircled the regiment, but at daylight in driving rain, the regiment pulled out and headed back to the Kall river crossing. Their trip down the gorge, and across the river was a disaster. One company, came back with just 81 of its 193 men, while other the companies were picked off or taken prisoner. Fortunately, the Germans had allowed the American litter-bearers and wounded to use the kall trail, so at least most of the wounded, who would have otherwise died or passed into captivity were able to get to safety. In the end, when the final count came, it was found that the 28th Division had suffered 6184 casualties (included dead, wounded and prisoners) in just six days of combat. The division had shot its bolt, and was being withdrawn. It would be replaced by the 4th Infantry Division almost immediately. The 28th, in meantime was sent to take over a 25-mile front in the Ardennes forest, but its recuperation would be cut short by the the Battle of Bulge, a few weeks later.