THE LUFTWAFFE RETURNS WITH A VENGEANCE

Even though Malta's defenses had improved, its civilians still continued to suffer terrible privations. The enemy was flying raids at all hours. At day, nimble fighters, dodging the defenses in ones and twos, made fast hit-and-run attacks on the civilian targets; at night, heavy and medium bombers droned overhead in the dozens - raining down bombs on cities and towns. The raids and the constant assaults on naval supply convoys ensured that there were constant shortages among food and commodity stores. The Maltese in turn introduced stringent rationing, built sandstone shelters and hoped for the situation to improve - for there was little else they could do.

By the end of 1941, control of the Mediterranean had fallen to axis forces, but Malta hung on, a thorn in the enemy's sides - it's ecclectic assortment of squadrons causing enermous losses to axis shipping. During the five months between June to October 1941, the Royal Navy and the RAF sunk between them 200 000 tons of shipping. Such losses were having an adverse effect on the offensive capabilities of the Afrika Korps in North Africa. Rommel wanted the island invaded, but a proposed airborne and parachute assault code-named 'Operation Hercules' never got beyond the planning stage, and so the Germans decided to pound Malta to oblivion. The task of destroying Malta as a British base was entrusted to Fliegerkorps II (itself under Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 - veterans of the Battle of Britain and Russia), and the Mussolini's Regia Aeronautica. As Kesselring stepped up his offensive, the Maltese took to the shelters as well as living in the vast natural caves beneath Valletta. A blackout was enforced and fuel shortages and food rationing became a familiarity. The air raids had begun with earnest once again on 22 December 1941 and by 1 March 1942 had increased toan unexperienced crescendo, continuing non-stop during a period for forty days.

Blazing Fury: A furious barrage of ack-ack fire is aimed at yet another enemy raid.

Three regular squadrons (126, 185 and 249) and a mixtures of flights and detachments, all equipped with Hurricanes had to hold the line against a better and numerically superior enemy. Their mission: hold back the enemy tide, which was often composed of as many as 200 aircraft per raid. Since June 1940, the defending fighters were credited with the destruction of 199 enemy aircraft with a further 78 probables, to which the AA defenses added 50 victories. But the cost had been high: at least 90 Hurricanes, 3 Fulmars and 1 Gladiator had been lost in action, while a further ten Hurricanes and two Fulmars were lost in accidents. In addition to these losses, scores of fighters had been lost on the ground. As for other aircraft, eight Marylands and two other reconnaissance aircraft had been lost up to the end of 1941, as were three Beaufighters, one fighter Blenheim and large numbers of bombers, lost both the in the air and on the ground. Enemy losses amounted to 135 bombers (80 of them German) and 56 fighters, plus some reconnaissance and transport types. The leading RAF aces of the day were Sergeant F.N. Robertson of 261 Squadron with ten victories and Squadron Leader 'Sandy' Rabagliati of 126 Squadron and Flight Lt J.A.F. MacLachlan, both with eight kills.

Defense of the island had reached intensely challenging levels. The nerve center to the RAF operations was the Central Fighter Operations Building, situated deep underground. In operation, it resembled Fighter Command's sector command stations during the Battle of Britain, but in terms of equipment, it was woefully neglected.

By the end of February, Malta's three airfields had been badly scarred by bombs, and the Valletta dockyards was in shambles. In response, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder of RAF Middle East asked Group Captain Basil E. Embrey, one of the RAF's most successful air leaders, to investigate Malta's situation and recommend improvements. Embrey visited the island in late January and made an untarnished report of what he found lacking. His report indicated that only the Spitfire Mk V, which had a climb rate of 3180 feet per minute, the firepower and fighting ceiling, could operate against the raiders. Second, he rejected the absurdity that radar would not work on Malta, and recommended the immediate installment of the device on the island. Lastly, he suggested that the job of senior fighter controller go to a serving officer of at least Group Captain rank to give authority, while that of the standard controller be given to a seasoned expert, preferably a former Fighter Command Sector controller. Embrey's recommendations went into immediate effect. The British government, which was already considered sending Spitfires to Malta, immediately acted on the report and authorized a consignment of Spitfires to be sent in March.

In the meantime, Group Captain A.B. 'Woodie' Woodhall, a sector controller with No. 12 Group in England was dispatched to Malta within days of Embrey's recommendations and he had begun the development of a comprehensive defensive network. Six radar stations were set up, and their controllers were based in caves under Valletta (called the 'Ditch'). Yet, in the interim, the situation was far from easy. On a typical day, an RAF squadron could field on average only six battle-worn Hurricanes against a mass of new Me109F fighters and high-speed Junker Ju88 bombers.

Above: Valetta Grand harbour in flames. ©IWM

Scratch One: British fire crews attempt to put out a bombed Hurricane at Takali.

The victory tally of January 1942 clearly illustrates the odds that Lloyd's pilots faced: for the loss of eight valuable Hurricanes, British fighter pilots had been credited with only one victory, five probables and twelve damaged. In February, nine enemy fighters had been shot down for the loss of 11 Hurricanes in combat. Malta's anti-shipping and bomber forces had also been hammered. Me110s from North Africa and twin-engined nightfighters from Germany would scour the waters off Malta shooting down any aircraft to make an appearance. More than twenty of Malta's strike fighters were lost in the first two months of 1942, until by the end of March, the strike force had been almost completely destroyed. (For RAF order of battle see AppendixA) February 1942 was also the month that the island's last remaining Wellingtons were withdrawn to Egypt, following heavy losses. Worse still, later that month, an important convoy from Alexandra was sunk, and Malta was suddenly in the throes of a grim existence for there were only a few weeks worth of supplies left.

Destroyers: Two Me110Ds from Zerstörergeschwader 26 prowl around in the Mediterranean on an interdiction mission.

Efforts to reinforce the RAF continued and between the months of February and March 1942, Beaufighters from 252 Squadron flew in again, followed by Wellingtons of No. 37 Squadron. Also making regular stops at Malta were Sunderland flying-boats ferrying in fresh pilots from England and North Africa. Still, regardless of the efforts, the situation showed no signs of improving. More than 2000 axis bomber sorties had hit the island in the past thirty days; 1000 tons of bombs had been dropped in February alone, and day by day, the Hurricane force and its pilots were depleted in an unending battle of attrition with the Messerschmitts.

The situation was so desperate that statistically, of a flight that took off to intercept the enemy, roughly half came back - often to an airfield that was a smoking ruin littered with burnt-out wrecks. By the beginning of March there were only eight serviceable Hurricanes left on the island. The Air Staff sent a desperate letter to Air Marshal Arthur Tedder in Cairo indicating the situation in Malta: 'Our view is that Malta is of such importance both as an air staging post and as an impediment to enemy reinforcement route that the most drastic steps are justifiable to sustain it… it will continue to be of great importance to war as a whole by containing important enemy forces during critical months.'

Tedder immediately dispatched No. 229 Squadron equipped with twenty-four Hurricane Mk IIs to Malta, but it took two weeks for the squadron to get there and barely a fortnight had passed when it was take off operations after sixteen of its Hurricanes were destroyed or badly damaged in action. Four of its pilots had been killed and another five were wounded. Then, as if to underline the superiority of the new Me109s, not a single enemy airplane had been shot down. The need for the Spitfires had grown ever stronger.

Woodhall knew that for the aerial situation to improve, the fighter squadrons would have to be led in the air by an experienced fighter leader. The job went to Squadron Leader Stanley Turner, who in February 1942, was appointed to command No. 249 Squadron, the premier fighter squadron in Malta. For Turner, who was long-used the disciplined life in England, there was rude awakening in store. On his first day in Maltese soil, as he stepped off the launch from the Sunderland flying boat that had brought him there, he spotted five lumbering Hurricanes at 4000 ft struggling to gain altitude in an obsolete 'vic' formation, as, above them, at 10 000 ft, roved twelve Me109s in the more efficient 'finger-four' formation. Having had his fair share of the disastrous 'vic' back during the tumultuous days of 1940, Turner exploded: 'Jesus Christ! They are not going to fly that way with me!' Within days of Turner's arrival, 249 Squadron had was using the 'finger-four' under the iron guidance of the tough pipe-smoking Canadian. The rest of the squadrons soon followed suit.

Smoking Fury: Beneath the calm exterior, S/L Stanley Turner hid a no-nonsense mindset and would not tolerate mistakes or incompetence in his ranks.

Above: The Vic was the standard RAF combat formation in the first three of years of war, and persisted in some places even after that. The 'Vic' had a standrad twelve-aircraft squadron flying in four groups of three aircraft - each tightly spaced and cramped. This made flying diffciult because the pilots concentrated more on avoiding coliisons rather than scouring for the enemy. The finger four ( right) formation meantime was devised by the Germans and was much superior. This formation enabled the standard four-aircraft flight to break away easily into pairs and allow for a quick pursuit, with each pilot covering each other's tail.

ENTER THE SPITFIRES

On March 7, HMS Eagle arrived at a point some 960 km (600 miles) west of Malta. Although it could not continue any further because of the risk of enemy warships and airplanes, it did however, launch fifteen Spitfire Mk Vs towards Malta. The entire operation had been conducted in great secrecy starting in February. Initially, the Spitfires were crated at the factory after manufacture and accompanied by sixteen pilots and a hundred mechanics, were transported to Gibraltar abound a merchant ship. In Gibraltar, British handlers, cautiosly unloaded from the crates from the ship at night (to avoid the prying eyes of a German observation station over the Spanish border) and working around the clock, assembled the Spifires within a large warehouse. Then, by night once again, the aircraft were loaded onboard the carrier, HMS Eagle on February 22nd.

On the 27th, Eagle in the company of HMS Argus, battleships, cruisers and destroyers left Gibraltar and dropped anchor on 5 March, 960 kilometers (600 miles) west of Malta. On March 7, preparations for flight were begun. The pilots were given instructions on the heading and approximate distance to the island, but they had to take off with 90-gallon (340 liters) external fuel tanks - which overloaded the fighters - and had only 667 feet of runway on the Eagle. To give every pilot the fair chance of a successful takeoff, the overweight Spitfires waited with flaps down until the carrier rose on a wave before the deck officer signaled them off. Squadron Leader Stanley Grant was the first to take off, and was followed by the others at fourteen pre-arranged intervals. Slowly, the formation of Spitfires assembled and headed towards Malta. But their presence had been noted by the enemy, who tried broadcasting false headings in English.

Unimpressed, the RAF pilots continued on their way, and guided by a flight of Blenheims landed safely in Malta a few hours later. These Spitfires were the first to be based outside England, and they gave the defenders a long overdue boost in morale. But their numbers were not enough to lessen, much less stop the raids. Two other similiar operations followed in the last two weeks of March, and Eagle brought in sixteen more Spitfires, but further transfers stopped when Eagle was withdrawn for repairs - leaving it out of service for more than a month. A replacement carrier had to be found but other British carriers were engaged elsewhere, and so Churchill turned to the Americans for aid. In a letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill pressed for the temporary use of USS Wasp to maintain the ferry service, and won his case. British commanders were overjoyed. Not only was the Wasp a much faster vessel than Eagle, it was also capable of carrying more Spitfires.

By the end of March, the attacks on Malta had risen to a new level of ferocity. Already, the last of the Blenheim squadrons on the island had been disbanded and the recently arrived Wellingtons of 37 Squadron destroyed. The RAF fighter could do little to halt the casualties. The Spitfires, which were never allowed to operate at strengths greater than six aircraft at a time (usually due to unserviceability) were incapable of turning the tide. Stiff fighting in the month of March saw at least a dozen RAF fighters shot down in air combat, while a further 29 were destroyed on the ground. One consolation for the British was that 31 enemy planes had been shot down, with another 20 probables and 65 damaged. Yet, it hardly seemed enough. There was no end to the axis offensive. Kesselring seemed to have inexhaustable reserves and he had no lack of targets to use them on.

Temporary relief: A Group of RAF pilots relax in-between sorties. The aircraft in the background are a Spitfire Mk Vc (serial No. BR498) flown by Wing Commander Peter Hanks of the Luqa Fighter Wing and a Bristol Beaufighter.

By the last days of March and well into April, the German attack had grown more concentrated. In all, between 24 March and 12 April, the enemy flew 2100 bomber sorties against Malta's docks, radar stations and aerodromes - damaging the three airfields to such levels that RAF fighters taking off from them or landing faced a danger equal to that of dogfighting . USS Wasp meantime was in Glasgow, taking on her consignment of Spitfires. It was only on 13 April, that she lifted anchor and set course for Gibraltar - passing the Straits of Gibraltar on the night of the 18th. In her innards were two whole squadrons of Spitfires (Nos. 601 and 603 Squadrons) with 47 fighters between them - the largest number to date. On April 20, preparations for flight were begun. Wasp was turned into the wind, and its Wildcat fighters scrambled to prevent possible enemy air intervention. Then the two RAF squadrons were flown off, but their arrival at Malta several hours later was untimely - they landed just as an air raid began.

The Spitfires were low on fuel and had little choice but to land - and became sitting ducks while ground crews desperately tried to refuel them. The result was a disaster for the RAF; thirty of the new fighters were destroyed or too badly damaged to fly again. In just two days , the Spitfire force had been reduced to just 11 fighters. It was Malta's darkest hour.

Ultimately, the Royal Navy was forced to evacuate its submarines and ships from the island. The Germans were thrilled, and Kesselring remarked to Hitler saying: 'The aerial attack has, I feel, eliminated Malta as a naval base.' The RAF on the island too was in jeopardy - its pitiful remnants of six fighter squadrons now patrolled the air with a fifth of its original strength. Sometimes, as little as ten fighters would rise to challenge two hundred enemy raiders.

Lloyd, on April 23rd, sent a pressing message to Tedder in Egypt, outlining the situation: "Both places (Takali 377 tons of bombs)... Luqa (122 tons) a complete shambles in spite of soldiers working day and night ... Have made every effort to get Spitfires off the ground ... All 'Spits' in pens widely dispersed, some with complete cover from blast ... In spite of this, 9 destroyed on the ground - direct hits, 29 damaged splintered rocks. Owing to heavy fighter escort, our battle casualties 8 Spitfires destroyed and seventy-five percent of remainder damaged in combat ... Army filling bomb holes day and night. Airmen work all day and, in shifts, throughout the night. Cannot do more to protect Wellingtons or Spitfires. Here everything liable to attack. German intention appears to be air blockade into submission...Aim now is to destroy harbour facilities so that when convoy arrives it will be difficult to unload ... Also to destroy aerodromes and all equipment for handling aircraft. To hold this island must have an adundance of Spitfires and hope to get them into air before next raid which was 90 minutes on this occasion."

In light of Lloyd's letter, Tedder visited the island in late April and found that there were only six serviceable fighters holding the line. He immediately knew that if Malta did not get any reinforcements, nothing could protect the allied convoys destined for Malta. Urgent plans were made to ferry more Spitfires to Malta, but until they arrived, the defenders were to hold out. By now, Malta's cities, towns and villages were being slowly reduced to rubble and the island's Governor and Commander in Chief, Lt General William Dobbie who had been with islanders since the beginning, suffered mental exhaustion. He was replaced by the aggressive General Lord John Standish Gort, VC, who had commanded the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) in France during 1939-1940, and until recently, held the post as the Governor of Gibraltar. He had the untimely honor of taking over right at the height of the siege in April. That month, 7000 tonnes of bombs fell on Malta - making it the most heavily bombed region of World War II. The spirit of the islanders had plummeted. Lord desperatly hunted for a morale saving grace, and it came on August 15, when King George VI bestowed England's highest civilian honor on Malta - the George Cross - the only singular instance during the war that it was awarded to a place.

The George Cross: The highest non-military award for valour. The face of the medal has an image of St. George slaying a dragon.

In his message to the Maltese, the king wrote:

'To honour her brave people I award the George Cross to the Island Fortress of Malta, to bear witness to a heroism and devotion that will long be famous in history.'

A further grace came on May 9, when Gort recived word that 64 Spitfires had flown in from Eagle and Wasp. This time, the British would leave nothing to chance, and the ground crews had the aircraft on operational status within ten minutes of landing. The enemy tried to intervene as before, but had not reckoned with the intense ack-ack umbrella put up by the army's anti-aircraft gunners. Under this barrage, the Spitfires took off and destroyed 23 of the enemy. The next day when the Germans returnedn, but were again held at bay by the ack-ack gunners, while the Spitfire took off. In all, the Germans launched a total of nine raids to destroy the Spitfires. They almost succeeded. The raids continued through out the rest of May, but the enemy now came over at a reduced pace. Malta now had an adequate number of fighter pilots although the fighters were themselves in short supply. Surviving Spitfires were now now being shared by many squadrons; at the same time, the Hurricane was becoming an object of distant memory due to battle losses. On 9 May, Pilot Officer Gordon R. Tweedale, one of the last of the Hurricane aces on the island with seven victories was shot down killed. Later, on 17 May, the first of the Spitfire aces, Flying Officer Peter Nash was also killed in action. Despite the losses, the RAF was credited with the destruction of 111 enemy aircraft in the month of May! - Twice the number claimed in April. RAF losses had been stiff with 25 Spitfires lost. To replenish the RAF, Eagle made three more Spitfire runs to Malta in May and June, delivering eighty fighters. Ten more Wellingtons were also flown in to keep the island's offensive capabilities alive, but the situation was grim. Many RAF pilots shared the sentiments of Pilot Officer Denis Braham, who said: "…it makes the Battle of Britain…seem like child's play."